

ity of the SS-20's, all these missiles constitute a potential threat to our European allies as well as to countries of Africa, the Middle East and the Far East.) In addition, each SS-20 launcher is believed to be equipped with one (triple warhead) refire missile, and the Soviets have retained 248 older SS-4 and SS-5 single warhead LRINF missiles.

Until the end of last year, the U.S. and NATO had deployed no comparable LRINF systems. To redress the imbalance in Europe caused by Soviet SS-20 deployments, NATO began in December 1983 the installation in Europe of U.S. PERSHING II ballistic missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM's). Absent a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement, 108 PER-SHING II's and 464 GLCMs (all carrying a single warhead) are scheduled for installation in NATO Europe by 1988.

At the same time, while we recognize the necessity for nuclear force modernization to maintain a credible deterrent and provide an incentive to the Soviets for negotiation of reductions, we are also determined to maintain our nuclear arsenal at the lowest possible level. In this context, my NATO Defense Minister colleagues and I decided in October of this year that we could safely withdraw 1400 nuclear weapons from Europe over the next several years, in addition to the 1000 that the United States withdrew in 1980 and the one-for-one withdrawals that will occur as PERSHING II and GLCM deployments take place. By contrast, the Soviet Union has threatened to increase the numbers of shorter-range INF missiles in Eastern Europe as a reprisal for NATO LRINF deployments.

3. What have been the annual U.S. and Soviet growth rates for military investment in terms of dollar costs since 1976?

In the period 1976 to 1981, CIA estimates that Soviet military investment (procurement, military construction, research, development, testing and evaluation) grew at an average annual rate of 2-3 percent in dollar cost terms. U.S. military investment grew at an average annual rate of 5.8 percent.

As a result, Soviet military investment in 1981 was 70-75 percent larger than U.S. military investment. In 1976 Soviet military investment had been about twice as large as U.S. investment.

4. Is it your opinion that, since 1976, there has been a one-sided arms race, a race the United States has not entered, with respect to total defense, strategic forces, and investments?

As I wrote in the Washington Post, the arms race of the last 15 years has indeed been one-sided. Over the last few years, as is well known, the United States has undertaken to rebuild its defenses. But the figures cited above suggest that the "race" as measured in these terms has not gotten particular close. A slower expansion of the enormous Soviet military program is certainly preferable to a fast expansion of an enormous Soviet program, particularly if this is a permanent trend. But the enormity of that program, compared to ours, should not be overlooked.

5. In light of the new CIA revisions, are the statements and conclusions you made in the fiscal year 1983 annual report to the Congress, pages II-4 to II-7, and the accompanying charts, accurate or inaccurate? If there are inaccuracies in the text or charts, will you indicate what they are and how they should be corrected?

The statements and conclusions in my fiscal year 1983 Annual Report to Congress remain valid. A few of the numbers would be revised in the light of newer estimates. out none of the revisions would be dramatic.

Soviet military investment was said to range between "80 to 90 percent" greater than U.S. investment during the past five years. That would now read "70 to 100 percent" (1976-81).

The rough estimate of "accumulated military assets"-based on the assumption that military investments have a useful life of 20 years and are valued at their initial costwould remain about the same. The comparison is particularly useful in putting the adjustments in CIA estimates in context: the much greater absolute size of Soviet military investment over a long period of years is a major source of the problems this administration has been trying to overcome. The 5 percent growth projection for the Soviet side was simply an extrapolation of the recent trend; if the graph were being drawn now, we could use the 2-3 percent trend of 1976-81 or the higher rate based on earlier experience. I also include with this letter a graph reflecting more recent information. It confirms the general thrust of our previous presentation.

In comparing the size of Warsaw Pact investment programs to those of NATO and Japan, the citation in the fiscal year 1983 report of WP programs as "15 to 20 per-cent" larger would be changed to "12 to 13 percent" to reflect more recent information, and the fiscal 1983 reference to a Warsaw Pact advantage in effective investment of "35 to 40 percent" would be scaled downward to "30 to 35 percent."

6. Do you plan to incorporate the new CIA revised estimates in your next annual report to Congress?

CIA's dollar cost comparisons of military investment were included in the fiscal year 1984 Annual Report. The most recent available data will be reflected in the upcoming fiscal year 1985 report.

In closing, let me add a comment on the general question you have raised. It will be good news if the Soviet Union does not expand its military program as rapidly in the coming decade as it did in the 1960's and 1970's. But estimates of slowed Soviet military growth do not change our assessment of the threat posed by the military assets of the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has accumulated these military assets by sustaining a level of investment far surpassing our own over a long period of time. Soviet military investments even now are 70-75 percent larger than ours, while the dollar cost of Soviet strategic forces activities is even now three times as large as ours.

The most recent trends may be grounds for some encouragement, but they do not provide any basis for diminishing our own efforts. We must continue to revitalize America's strength and capabilities to ensure peace with freedom.

Sincerely.

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER.

VALUE OF AMERICA'S WETLANDS

HON. NORMAN D. SHUMWAY OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 30, 1984

• Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Speaker, during the congressional recess late last year, an outstanding article concerning the value of America's wetlands appeared in the Los Angeles Times. Its author is my friend and constituent, Bob Eberhardt, who presently makes outstanding contributions as the president of Ducks, Unlimited.

This effective conservation organization is headquartered in Long Grove. Ill., and Bob's article underscores the fine contributions made by "D.U."

Most of all, the article stresses the need to preserve America's wetlands. As its title states so clearly, "Wetlands Are Not Wastelands."

I commend the article to my colleagues' attention.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 25, 19831

WETLANDS ARE NOT WASTELANDS, AS WE'LL FIND OUT WHEN THEY'RE GONE

(By Robert Eberhardt)

With an efficiency that is a grim tribute to modern engineering and technology, the United States will lose 458,000 acres of wetlands this year. The marshes, sloughs, swamps and bogs will hardly be missed by most Americans; if they think about wetlands at all, it tends to be as empty real estate that breeds mosquitoes and other pests, attractive only to adventurous children who come home covered with a rine goo that resists the most miraculous detergents.

Apart from the image problem, arguing the case for wetlands has always been difficult because they seem to be forever standing in the way of progress of one sort or another. You cannot pave or farm a marsh until you drain or dike it. Indeed, controversies between developers and conservationists, like the one involving the Ballona wetlands in Marina del Ray, show that the rightness or wrongness of development is one of perspective that cries out for compro-

You'd think that activists in the environmental field would be natural allies of wetlands preservation. There often is cooperation on immediate local controversies involving wetlands development. But in general the urban dweller who is quick to criticize the hunter who kills perhaps four ducks in a season will be oblivious to the developer whose buildozer will be the death of hundreds of waterfowl, mammals and innumerable other critters. Even less appreciated is the idea that the same developer will prevent untold generations of creatures from having a chance to live. And the same person who today may march to save the whales or seals or some such creatures could well be living over what once was a wetland teeming with life. The same pen used to write a check to an organization seeking to shut down the fur industry might well be used to sign a contract to build a home where the muskrat now room. Outbreaks of avian botulism-like the one that killed nearly 30,000 ducks, geese and shorebirds at Tulare Lake this fall—are often the result of waterfowl crowding caused by lack of suitable wetlands.

The inherent benefits of wetlands go far beyond their ability to support wildlife, however:

Studies by ecologist Eugene Odum showed that Georgia salt marshes produce 10 tons of organic material per acre per year, whereas the most fertile hayfields produce only four tons a year.

A study of Tinicum Marsh, a few miles from the Philadelphia airport, measured pollutants in a broad tidal creek that transects the marsh. Readings were taken before the creek overflowed its banks into the marsh and two to five hours later, when the water returned to the creek. Chemical and bacteriological samplings indicated that the marsh significantly improved water quality by increasing the exygen content and reducing nutrient load.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

A Ducks Unlimited-funded project at the University of Saskatchewan has shown that bulrush and cattail, two common marsh plants, have insatiable appetites for raw sewage. Their roots produce an antibiotic substance that attacks and kill fecal bacteria. The root systems also absorb dangerous chemicals in domestic sewage, trapping the toxic elements in their tissues and in some cases breaking them down into harmless elements.

A 10-acre wetland stores 1.5 million gallons of water when there is a 6-inch rise caused by rain. The damage caused by heavy rain in Mississippi and Texas this year would not have been nearly as severe had the farmers and developers left the swamps and bottomland forests to act as natural sponges during periods of prolonged rainfall.

Environmental economists have estimated that it would cost society \$50,000 to \$80,000 to replace all of the functions that just one wetland acre performs.

To be sure, no one is suggesting that all development be stopped, or that every wetland remain wet forever. But there are considerable advantages to both wildlife and man in saving some of the wetlands that still exist. The most fertile U.S. wetlands in terms of waterfowl are located in what is called the prairie pothole region of the Dakotas, Montana and Minnesota, where 85% of the nation's waterfowl breed. Losing those wetlands simply for the sake of additional surplus grain or more exurbias would seem to be a ridiculous trade-off.

Even on wetlands that remain untouched there are heavy choices to be made. Wildlife that is generally considered desirable must be managed. Resource managers, faced with escalating costs and stagnant revenues, can't "let nature take its course"—not as long as civilization chooses to constantly alter nature's landscape to suit its own needs. You can denude a mountain knowing that sometime in the not-so-distant future the vegetation will return. You can let livestock overgraze a pasture or a meadow knowing that it, too, will bounce back. You can change the course of a river knowing that time and human neglect will allow it to change back. But once a glacially formed wetlands pothole is drained and leveled it is gone—at least until the next Ice Age.

The nation's wetland inventory, which has been reduced to 95 million acres from 215 million acres since the founding of the Republic, is being depleted at an alarming rate. The question that we must address is whether such losses and all that they entail are worth the societal gains of additional farmland, shopping malls and housing developments. For our children's sake, let us hope that they are not.

POLYGRAPH LIMITATION AND ANTI-CENSORSHIP ACT

HON. JACK BROOKS

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 30, 1984

• Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984. This bill is in response to the administration's initiative to mandate prepublication censorship agreements for over 127,000 Federal officials and contractor employees who have access to certain classified information. These agreements would require the submission for governmental review of

all writings, including fiction and speeches, which touch upon intelligence matters. It is a lifelong requirement.

This bill is also in response to the administration's proposals to increase the Government's use of polygraph tests. For example, the Department of Defense would require polygraph exams in pre-employment interviews for positions requiring access to certain classified information. Thereafter, polygraph exams would be given randomly in continuing security checks. Throughout the Government the new polygraph policies would cover over 2.5 million Federal employees.

The Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censored Act of 1984 will prohibit the Federal Government's use of prepublication review requirements for its employees, except at the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Also, with the exception of those two agencies, this bill will prohibit the use of polygraph tests of Federal employees except in properly developed and focused investigations and under truly voluntary conditions.

My bill incorporates the recommendations of an oversight report issued by the Committee on Government Operations in November, following an extensive review of the administration's proposals. The committee found that there is great risk of mislabeling persons based on polygraph examinations-innocent people may be declared liars; subversives may be allowed access to secret material. There is simply no evidence to support the validity of polygraph use as proposed. The committee also found that the President's prepublication censorship requirements pose a tremendous threat to our constitutional rights of free speech and open public debate.

We all recognize the need to protect sensitive national security information but the administration's polygraph and censorship proposals will not achieve that objective. I hope my colleagues will join me in rejecting these sweeping and dangerous proposals.

CONGRESS AND THE BUDGET

HON. THOMAS A. DASCHLE

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 30, 1984

• Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Speaker, as we approach the coming congressional session, we are all aware of the absolute necessity to take some action regarding the massive budget deficits that are being projected for the upcoming fiscal year and the years beyond. It is all too easy to finger point and assign blame, particularly in a year that will see another Presidential election. However, it is my sincere hope that we will be able to overcome those temptations, and work in a spirit

of cooperative harmony in making the difficult decisions that we face in attempting to reduce unacceptable budget deficits.

Along those lines, I thought it would be helpful to call your attention to an article in the January 29 edition of the Washington Post. The thrust of this article is to exhibit where the deficits are coming from, and what actions we can realistically expect to take to reduce them. Before plunging headlong into heated budget debates, I feel it would be advisable to find out where the Federal budget is growing, so we can more realistically look at where it can be cut back.

The article follows:

THE MISERS OF CAPITOL HILL—CONGRESS'
SPENDTHRIFT IMAGE IS A BAD RAP

(By Norman Ornstein)

It's fashionable to blame Congress and its responsible spending habits for all our current and future economic ills. We can expect plenty of that this election year, even though President Reagan chose not to do so directly in his State of the Union message Wednesday night. Why, even members of Congress line up to volunteer for the blame.

The public is easy to convince. Few images are as fixed in conventional wisdom as that of a Congress populated by profligate, irresponsible, pork-crazed individuals unwilling and unable to control wild domestic federal spending, bending to the whims of any and all special interests.

But there is a problem here: the conventional wisdom is wrong. As the numbers and the history show clearly, it is the critics—not Congress—who are irresponsible.

Of course, none of the critics has accused Congress of irresponsibly hiking defense spending. Indeed, President Reagan and like-minded commentators applaud the future budget increases in defense and want considerably more. The attack on Congress is all focused on the domestic side of the ledger. So let's examine the ledger, using administration figures. Table 1 gives budget outlays for 1980, 1983 and up-to-date projections for 1984 and 1988 in constant, 1983 billions of dollars (i.e., adjusted for inflation).

TABLE 1.—BUDGET OUTLAYS IN 1983 DOLLARS

	1980	1983	1984	1988
Total outlays	707.0	795.9	829.5	950.4
	166.6	210.5	235.1	308.1
	64.7	87.7	100.5	120.1
	182.9	22.4	229.3	267.0
	293.2	275.4	264.6	255.3

There is, obviously, substantial growth built into these budget projections. But look where the growth is coming from. From 1983 to 1988, the total budget is to grow, in constant dollars, by \$154.5 billion. Defense is to grow by \$97.6 billion, or 63 percent of the total growth, Interest on the debt is to grow by \$32.4 billion, or 21 percent of the total. Social Security and Medicare are to grow by \$44.6 billion, or 29 percent of the total.

That adds up to 113 percent—because all other domestic spending, everything but Social Security and Medicare, declines in constant dollars by \$20.1 billion.

In simple terms, then, there are three causes of future growth in government spending: defense, by far the largest; debt interest, and Social Security and Medicare.

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NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 30, 1984

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Dear Colleague:

Today, I introduced the "Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984." This bill is in response to this Administration's efforts to greatly increase the use of polygraph exams in the Federal Government and to require thousands of high-level Government officials to submit to prepublication censorship.

On March 11, 1983, the President issued a security directive to all executive agencies and departments contending that additional safeguards are needed to protect classified information. The directive mandates the greater use of and reliance on polygraph examinations and requires Federal employees to submit to such exams or face the prospect of adverse consequences. Additionally, the directive imposes on all individuals with access to classified information designated Sensitive Compartmented Information, or SCI, a prepublication review agreement which requires the submission for governmental review of all writings, including fiction, and proposed speeches which touch upon intelligence matters. This requirement is life long.

These changes immediately received widespread public criticism and last session Congress acted to block the implementation of these new policies until April 15, 1984, so they could be carefully reviewed. The Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations conducted an extensive review of these new policies, including a public hearing last October. Congress' General Accounting Office and Office of Technology Assessment were requested to collect and analyze information relevant to the proposed changes.

Based on these studies and the testimony presented, the Government Operations Committee concluded in a report adopted on November 15, 1983 that the validity of the polygraph is not scientifically supported for the purpose and manner of its use proposed by the Administration. The committee found that the risk of mislabeling persons based upon polygraph exams is great in these new policies. Specifically, the committee found that there was no scientific evidence to demonstrate the validity of polygraph use for screening purposes, and that such use runs a great risk of incorrectly identifying large numbers of persons as liars. Further, the committee found that, in any context, a policy of forcing employees to submit to polygraph testing through the threat of sanctions, may seriously and adversely affect the polygraph examination's validity.

With regard to the President's prepublication review requirements, the committee found that it constitutes an unwarranted prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. It poses a tremendous threat to the freedoms of speech and public debate cherished in our nation. The committee urged the withdrawal of the new policies, but to date no action has been taken.

The "Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984" would legislatively prevent these policies and others like them from being implemented. While this bill would not affect any activities of the CIA or NSA, it would prohibit other Federal agencies from using prepublication review requirements. It would outlaw the Federal Government's use of polygraphs for screening purposes and their use when submission has been coerced through the threat of sanctions. The bill will not prohibit the Government's use of polygraphs in properly conducted investigations when used under truly voluntary conditions. Remedies for violations of this Act will be available through the Federal courts.

We all clearly recognize the need to protect sensitive information relating to our national security. However, the Administration's proposals will not achieve that objective. They are irreparably flawed and should be rejected. you would like to join me as a cosponsor, please contact the Government Operations Office at extension 55051.

back BROOKS

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